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Abstract
The standard first-order reading of modality does not bind indi-
vidual variables, i.e., if x is free in F (x), then x remains free in 2F (x).
Accordingly, if 2 stands for ‘provable in arithmetic,’ ∀x2F (x) states
that F (n) is provable for any given value of n = 0, 1, 2, . . .; this corre-
sponds to a de re reading of modality. The other, de dicto meaning of
2F (x), suggesting that F (x) is derivable as a formula with a free vari-
able x, is not directly represented by a modality, though, semantically,
it could be approximated by compound constructions, e.g., 2∀xF (x).
We introduce the first-order logic FOS4∗ in which modalities can
bind individual variables and, in particular, can directly represent
both de re and de dicto modalities. FOS4∗ extends first-order S4 and
is the natural forgetful projection of the first-order logic of proofs
FOLP. The same method of introducing binding modalities obviously
works for other modal logics as well.
1 Introduction
Let A(x) be a formula with a parameter x. Then, in the standard read-
ing of the modality in first-order language, formula 2A(x) also has x as a
∗Partially supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research.
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parameter. In the provability interpretation of 21, this reflects the reading
of 2A(x) as
given a natural parameter x = n, formula A(n) is provable,
whereas the alternative meaning
formula A(x) with a free variable x is provable
does not have a direct modal representation.
We extend the first-order modal language with a construction that makes
it possible. Namely, we replace the modality 2 by a family of modalities 2X ,
each labeled by a finite set of individual variables X. In a formula 2XA, the
modality 2X binds all variables in A except those in X. We call 2X binding
modalities.
In Section 2, we introduce the logic FOS4∗ which is a version of first-order
modal logic S42 in the richer language with binding modalities. In Section
3, we present the sequent calculus for FOS4∗ that admits cut-elimination. In
Section 4, we discuss the connections between FOS4∗ and first-order S4. In
Section 6, we show that the first-order logic of proofs FOLP is able to realize
FOS4∗ which, in combination with the results of the previous sections, yields
another proof of the Realization Theorem for FOS4 and FOLP. Section 5 is
devoted to the Kripke-style semantics for FOS4∗.
2 Modal logic with binding modalities
By X, Y , etc., we denote finite sets of individual variables. If y is an indi-
vidual variable, then we will write Xy for X∪{y}. An additional convention:
notation Xy means, in part, that y 6∈ X.
Definition 1 Let L∗ denote the first-order modal language that contains
individual variables x0, x1, x2, . . . , Boolean connectives, quantifiers over in-
dividual variables, predicate symbols Qni of any arity n (i, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),
and the family of modal operators 2X where X ranges over finite sets of
individual variables.
1For informal and formal provability interpretations of modality see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
2First-order modal logic S4 has postulates of first-order classical logic and modal pos-
tulates of S4: 2(F→G)→ (2F→2G), 2F→22F , 2F→F , and the necessitation rule
‘` F yields ` 2F .’
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Formulas are defined in the standard way. The only difference is in the
definition of open and closed occurrences of variables: the modality 2X binds
all variables except those from X, namely,
• All occurrences of individual variables in an atomic formula are free.
• Boolean connectives preserve free and bound occurrences of variables.
• ∀x binds all occurrences of x in ∀xA and preserves free and bound
occurrences of all other variables.
• Free occurrences of variables from X in A, and only they, are free in
2XA.
The set of free variables of a formula A is denoted by FVar(A).
Note also that in 2X , variables from X are merely a syntactic label of
this modality and are not considered occurrences of variables.
Definition 2 The logic FOS4∗ is axiomatized by the following schemas. Here
A, B are formulas, X is a set of individual variables, and y is an individual
variable.
A0 classical axioms of first-order logic
A1 2XyA→ 2XA, y 6∈ FVar(A)
A2 2XA→ 2XyA
A3 2XA→ 2X∀xA, x 6∈ X
B1 2X(A→B)→(2XA→2XB)
B2 2XA→ 2X2XA
B3 2XA→A
FOS4∗ has the following inference rules:
R1 ` A,A→ B ⇒ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 ` A ⇒ ` ∀xA generalization
R3 ` A ⇒ ` 2∅A necessitation.
We define derivations in FOS4∗ and derivations from the hypothesis in the
standard manner. In particular, in a derivation from the set of hypotheses
Γ, the generalization rule may not be applied to variables that are free in Γ.
Note that each 2X is a normal propositional modality. In particular, the
following standard lemma holds:
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Lemma 1 1. FOS4∗ ` 2X(A ∧B)↔ (2XA ∧2XB).
2. If FOS4∗ ` A↔ B then FOS4∗ ` 2XA↔ 2XB.
Modality 2∅, which considers all individual variables as local and admits
unlimited quantification under its scope, represents de dicto modality.
The following lemma shows that the principle
2XA→ 2X∀xA with x 6∈ X,
(e.g., axiom A3) is derivable from the rest of FOS4∗. However, we decide to
keep it in the list of FOS4∗ postulates to underline the significance of this
principle. Furthermore, the proof of Lemma 2 relies on transitivity axiom
B2 and hence does not work for logics without transitivity, e.g., binding
modalities versions of first-order logics K or T which, however, should contain
A3.
Lemma 2 FOS4∗ ` 2XA↔ 2X∀xA, provided x 6∈ X.
Proof. The left-to-right direction.
1. 2XA→A axiom B3;
2. ∀x2XA→∀xA from 1 by first-order logic;
3. 2XA→∀x2XA by first-order logic, since x 6∈ FVar(2XA);
4. 2XA→∀xA from 2,3 by first-order logic;
5. 2∅(2XA→∀xA) from 4 by R3;
6. 2X(2XA→∀xA) from 5 in view of A2;
7. 2X2XA→2X∀xA from 6 by B1 and propositional logic;
8. 2XA→ 2X2XA axiom B2;
9. 2XA→2X∀xA from 7, 8 by propositional logic.
The right-to-left direction.
1. ∀xA→A by first-order logic;
2. 2∅(∀xA→A) from 1 by R3;
3. 2X(∀xA→A) from 2 in view of A2;
4. 2X∀xA→2XA from 3 in view of B1. 2
A straightforward iteration of Lemma 2 yields
Lemma 3 Let A be a formula in the language FOS4∗. By Ac we denote a
new formula obtained from A by replacing each subformula of A of the form
2XB by 2X∀y1 . . . ∀ynB where Y = {y1, . . . , yn} = FVar(B) \ X. Then
FOS4∗ ` A↔ Ac.
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3 Cut-elimination
We define a sequent calculus for FOS4∗ similar to that of the sequent
calculus for FOS4 (see [7], Section 9.1.3). In addition to structural rules
(including the cut-rule), the sequential calculus for FOS4∗ denoted by GFOS4∗
contains the following axioms:
⊥ ⇒ and P (~x)⇒ P (~x)
and logical rules:
Γ, A⇒ ∆, B
(R→),
Γ⇒ ∆, A→ B
Γ⇒ ∆, A, Γ, B ⇒ ∆
(L→),
Γ, A→ B ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, A
(R∀),
Γ⇒ ∆,∀x A
Γ, A(y/x)⇒ ∆
(L∀),
Γ,∀x A⇒ ∆
2X1A1, . . . ,2XnAn ⇒ A (R2),
2X1A1, . . . ,2XnAn ⇒ 2XA
Γ, A⇒ ∆
(L2).
Γ,2A⇒ ∆
In R∀, we suppose that x 6∈ FVar(Γ,∆). In R2, we assume that
(
n⋃
i=1
Xi) ∩ FVar(A) ⊆ X.
The following connection between FOS4∗ and its Gentzen-style version
GFOS4∗ takes place:
Lemma 4
GFOS4∗ ` Γ⇒ ∆ iff FOS4∗ `
∧
Γ→
∨
∆.
Proof. In order to prove left–to–right implication, reason by induction on
the derivaion in GFOS4∗. The only nontrivial cases here are the modal rules
R2 and L2.
For L2, by the induction hypothesis, FOS4∗ ` A ∧ (∧Γ) → ∨∆. Since
FOS4∗ ` 2XA→ A, we obtain FOS4∗ ` 2XA ∧ (
∧
Γ)→ ∨∆.
For R2, the induction hypothesis yields that FOS4∗ ` (∧2XiAi) → B.
Then for X ′ =
⋃
iXi we have
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1. 2∅((
∧
2XiAi)→ B) by R3;
2. 2X′(
∧
2XiAi)→ B) from 1 in view of A2;
3. 2X′(
∧
2XiAi)→ 2X′B from 2 in view of B1;
4. 2X′(
∧
2XiAi)↔
∧
(2X′2XiAi) by Lemma 1;
5. 2XiAi → 2Xi2XiAi by B2;
6. 2Xi2XiAi → 2X′2XiAi by A2;
7. 2XiAi → 2X′2XiAi from 5, 6;
8.
∧
i2XiAi → 2X′(
∧
2XiAi) from 4, 7;
9. 2X′B → 2XB by A1;
10.
∧
i2XiAi → 2XB by 3, 8, 9.
In order to prove right–to–left implication it suffices to show that
GFOS4∗ ` ⇒ A
where A is any axiom of FOS4∗. Below are the proofs for axioms A1 and A2;
axioms B1–B3 are derived similarly with the standard FOS4.
Axiom A1. If y 6∈ FVar(A), then the tree below is a valid derivation in
GFOS4∗:
A⇒ A
2XyA⇒ A
2XyA⇒ 2XA.
Axiom A2.
A⇒ A
2XA⇒ A
2XA⇒ 2XyA.
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Theorem 1 (Cut-elimination) If GFOS4∗ ` Γ ⇒ ∆, then Γ ⇒ ∆ can be
derived in GFOS4∗ without using the cut-rule.
Proof. We repeat the standard proof of the cut-elimination theorem for
GFOS4 by joint induction on the complexity of the cut and its rank (see [7]).
2
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4 Connection to first-order modal logic
In this section, we study the interconnection between FOS4∗ and the
standard modal logic FOS4.
Definition 3 Let A be a first-order modal formula. By A∗ we mean a for-
mula of the language of FOS4∗ that is obtained from A by replacing all oc-
currences of subformulas of A of the form 2B by 2XB where X = FVar(B).
Definition 4 Let ~x be a finite string of individual variables {x1, . . . , xn}.
By ~x, ~y we denote the concatenation of ~x and ~y. By ∀~xA and ∃~xA we mean
the formulas
∀x1, . . . ,∀xnA and ∃x1, . . . ,∃xnA
respectively.
Definition 5 For each FOS4∗-formula F , we define its translation to the
language of FOS4, denoted by F ], by induction. For atomic formulas, we
stipulate F ] = F , ] commutes with Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and
(2XF )
] = 2∀~yF ],
where ~y = {y0, . . . , yk} = FVar(F ) \X.
Note that FVar(A∗) = FVarA and FVar(F ]) = FVar(F ).
Lemma 5 If FOS4 ` F , then F ∗ is derivable in FOS4∗.
Proof. By induction on a derivation in FOS4. For the base of induction
consider axioms of FOS4.
• First-order axioms remain the same axioms.
• (2(A → B) → (2A → 2B))∗ = 2Z(A∗ → B∗) → (2XA∗ → 2YB∗)
where X = FVar(A), Y = FVar(B), and Z = X ∪ Y ; then in FOS4∗
we reason as follows.
1. 2Z(A
∗ → B∗)→ (2ZA∗ → 2ZB∗) axiom B1
2. 2ZA
∗ ↔ 2XA∗ axioms A1 and A2
3. 2ZB
∗ ↔ 2YB∗ axioms A1 and A2
4. 2Z(A
∗ → B∗)→ (2XA∗ → 2YB∗) from 1–3 by propositional logic
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• (2A→ 22A)∗ = 2XA∗ → 2X2XA∗ for X = FVarA; axiom B2.
• (2A→ A)∗ = 2XA∗ → A∗ for X = FVarA; as the axiom B3.
For the induction step, we note that the translation (·)∗ preserves Modus
Ponens and the generalization rule.
In the case of the necessitation rule, 2A is derived from A in FOS4, then
by the induction hypothesis FOS4∗ ` A∗; therefore in FOS4∗
2∅A∗ by R3;
2XA
∗ by A2 and Modus Ponens for X = FVar(A).
2
Theorem 2 If FOS4∗ ` A, then FOS4 ` A].
Proof. Induction on the derivation of A in FOS4∗. For the base of
induction, consider axioms of FOS4∗.
• Translation (·)∗ respects axioms of first-order logic.
• Axiom A1. If y 6∈ FVar(A), then (2XyA)] coincides with (2XA)].
• Axiom A2. If y 6∈ FVar(A), then (2XyA)] coincides with (2XA)] as
above. If y ∈ FVar(A), then (2XA)] = 2(∀y, ~yA]) and (2XyA)] =
2(∀~yA]); it is clear that the latter formula follows from the former one.
• Axiom B1. Let ~y, ~u = {y1, . . . , yk, u1, . . . , ul} be FVar(A) \ X, and
~z, ~u = {z1, . . . , zm, u1, . . . , ul} be FVar(B)\X, and ~u = {u1, . . . , ul} be
(FVar(B)∩FVar(A))\X. Then FVar(A→ B)\X is ~y, ~z, ~u. Therefore
(2X(A→B)→(2XA→2XB))] is
2(∀~y, ~z, ~u(A] → B]))→ 2(∀~y, ~uA])→ 2(∀~z, ~uB])),
which is clearly provable in FOS4 since no yi occures in B
] and no zi
occures in A].
• Axiom B2. Let ~y = {y1, . . . , yk} be FVar(A)\X. Since FVar(2XA) =
X, we obtain (2XA)
] = 2∀~yA] and (2X2XA)] = 22∀~yA]; therefore
the translation of B2 is an instance of the transitivity axiom in S4.
• Axiom B3. (2XA → A)] = (2~yA] → A]); the last formula is clearly
derivable in FOS4.
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2Corollary 1 FOS4 ` A if and only if FOS4∗ ` A∗.
Proof. The left–to–right direction is proven by Lemma 5. To prove
the right–to–left direction, we assume that FOS4∗ ` A∗. Since for each
subformula of A∗ of the form 2XB one has X = FVar(B), we conclude
that (A∗)] coincides with A. By Theorem 2, from FOS4∗ ` A∗ we obtain
FOS4 ` (A∗)], thus FOS4 ` A.
2
Corollary 2 FOS4∗ ` A if and only if FOS4 ` A].
Proof. The left–to–right direction is proven by Theorem 2. To prove
the right–to–left direction let us assume FOS4 ` A]. Then by Lemma 5,
we obtain FOS4∗ ` (A])∗. By induction on A it can be easily proven that
FOS4∗ ` (A])∗ ↔ A, therefore FOS4∗ ` A. 2
5 Semantics
Definition 6 An FOS4∗-model is a standard Kripke model for FOS4. Namely,
a frame F = (W,R,D) for FOS4∗ consists of a nonempty set of possible
worlds W 6= ∅, a transitive reflexive accessibility relation R ⊆ W 2, and a
domain function D which assigns a nonempty set D(u) to each element u of
W monotonically, i.e., uRv yields D(u) ⊆ D(v) for all u, v ∈ W .
A model M = (F , V ) is a frame F supplied with the validity function
V which assigns each n-ary predicate letter P and each possible world u a
subset of D(u)n (on which P is true at node u).3
For each formula A of the language FOS4∗, each substitution of σ of the
values from
U =
⋃
u∈W
D(u)
for free variables, and each u ∈ W , we define M, u |= Aσ by induction on
the complexity of A:
3For comparison, Kripke-style semantics for FOLP in [6] treats both variable binding
operators and proof terms.
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• if A is atomic, that is, A = P (x1, . . . , xn) for a predicate letter P , then
M, u |= Aσ iff (x1σ, . . . , xnσ) ∈ V (P, u);
• quantifiers and Boolean connectives are treated in the usual way;
• if A = 2XB, then M, u |= Aσ iff M, v |= Bσ′ for each v accessible
from u and each substitution σ′ which coincides with σ on variables
from X and assigns arbitrary elements from D(v) to the remaining free
variables of B.4
We say that A is valid in a model M (M |= A) if M, u |= A for each
u ∈ W .
Theorem 3 FOS4∗ ` A iff A is valid in all models.
Proof. Soundness follows easily by induction on derivations in FOS4∗.
Completeness follows immediately from the connection to FOS4 established
in Section 4. Indeed, suppose FOS4∗ 6` F . By Corollary 2, FOS4 6` A]. By
Completeness, there is an FOS4-model M in which A] does not hold in the
sense of FOS4, hence A] does not hold in M in the sense of FOS4∗. 2
6 Connection to the first-order logic of proofs
Definition 7 (see [4] for details). The language of the first-order logic of
proofs FOLP in the extension of the first-order language with a countable set
of predicate symbols of any arity, without functional symbols and equality
by special means to represent proofs and proof assertions, namely,
• proof variables and constants;
• functional symbols for operations on proofs: binary +, · and unary !
and genx for each individual variable x;
• an operational symbol (·):X(·) for each finite set X of individual vari-
ables.
4It is easy to see that M, u |= A if and only if M, u |= A] in the usual sense of FOS4.
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Proofs are representes by proof terms, constructed from proof constants and
variables by means of functional symbols. Formulas are defined in the stan-
dard way with an additional clause for proof assertions:
• if t is a proof term, A is a formula, and X is a finite set of individual
variales, then t:XA is a formula.
The intended semantics of t:XA is
t is a proof of A with parameters X
has been made precise in [4].
In addition to axioms and rules of first-order logic, FOLP has the following
axioms and rules.
• t:XyA→ t:XA, y 6∈ FVar(A)
• t:XA→ t:XyA
• t:XA→A
• s:X(A→B)→(t:XA→ [s·t]:XB)
• t:XA→ [t+ s]:XA, s:XA→ [t+ s]:XA
• t:XA→ !t:Xt:XA
• t:XA→genx(t):X∀xA, x 6∈ X
• ` c:A, where A is an axiom, c is a proof constant.
Definition 8 Let A be an FOS4∗–formula. By realization of a formula A,
we mean a formula Ar of the language of FOLP that is obtained from A by
replacing all occurrences of subformulas of A of the form 2XB by t:XB for
some proof terms t. To avoid unnecessary formalism, we suggest thinking of
a realization as a result of an iterated procedure which always replaces an
innermost 2B by t:XB. A realization is normal if all negative occurrences
of 2 are assigned proof variables.
Definition 9 The forgetful projection (·)0 of FOLP to the language FOS4∗
erases all terms in an FOLP-formula, namely, it replaces all subformulas of
the form t:XB by 2XB:
(t:XF )
0 = 2XF
0.
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Lemma 6 If FOLP ` F , then F 0 is derivable in FOS4∗.
Proof. By straightforward induction on derivations in FOLP. 2
Remark 1 Note that the forgetful projection of an FOLP–formula A to the
language of FOS4 (as defined in [4]) is a superposition of the forgetful pro-
jection of A to the language of FOS4∗ and the translation ] of FOS4∗ to
FOS4.
Similarly, a realization of an FOS4–formula A in FOLP is a composition
of the translation ∗ of A to FOS4∗ and a realization in FOLP.
Theorem 4 [Realization Theorem] If FOS4∗ ` A, then there is a normal
realization Ar such that FOLP ` Ar.
Proof. Induction on the cut-free proof in the Gentzen variant for FOS4∗
similar to that in [4]. 2
7 Conclusions
Binding modalities system FOS4∗ naturally contains both the traditional
de remodality 2F , which is represented by (2F )∗ i.e., 2XF withX being the
set of all free variables of F , and the de dicto modality, which is represented
by 2∅.
This extended set of modalities allows FOS4∗ to directly express and de-
rive new principles of modal logic. For example, FOS4∗ supports the Barcan
Formula for 2∅:
∀x2∅A→2∅∀xA,
which does not hold for the usual S4 modality rather than 2∅.
One could argue that FOS4∗ is as expressive as traditional FOS4 since
the binding modality 2XF can be semantically encoded by 2∀~yF where 2
is the FOS4 modality and ~y is the list of all free variables of F that are not
in X. However, such an encoding changes both formulas and derivations:
for example, converting 2∅A to 2∀xA renders the aforementioned Barcan
Formula meaningless within the context of FOS4. In FOS4∗, however, this is
a revealing and meaningful principle. We want to believe that the structural
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and semantic properties of the de dicto modality deserve direct study and a
designated formal logic system and that FOS4∗ is such a system.
FOS4∗ captures the de dicto modality in a coherent first-order manner,
offers a natural axiom system, sequent formulation with cut-elimination, and
Kripke model theory. It makes reasoning with variables in the modal context
explicit and hence a subject of formal analysis which could be of interest for
studies of modalities and applications.
In summary, FOS4∗ can be regarded as a version of FOS4 in a refined lan-
guage with an explicit mechanism of binding/unbinding variables which yet
enjoys the convenient features of FOS4, such as cut-elimination and Kripke
completeness.
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